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Principled Silence or Mere Silence on Principles?
The Role of the EU Charter’s Principles in the Case
Law of the Court of Justice
Jasper Krommendijk*
Historical background of the inclusion of social rights in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights – Distinction between rights and principles – Similarities
between the conditions for direct effect and the criteria for distinguishing between
Charter rights and principles – Implications of this distinction for the possibilities
of judicial review – Reluctance of the ECJ to explicitly deal with the distinction
until Glatzel, as illustrated by its earlier judgments in Dominguez and AMS.
Introduction
One of the most contentious issues to arise during the negotiations on the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000 and its ‘incorporation’ in the
Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties was the inclusion of social rights in the
Charter. On the one hand, various EUmember states and commentators favoured
the inclusion of social rights to address the social deﬁcit of an EU which primarily
championed economic freedoms. On the other hand, several states – especially the
UK – fervently opposed the inclusion of such ‘costly’ and aspirational (social)
rights. The disagreement was eventually overcome by inserting a distinction
between ‘rights’ and ‘principles’ in the Charter. Article 51(1) provides that EU
institutions and bodies as well as member states ‘shall therefore respect the rights,
observe the principles and promote the application thereof’, while Article 52(5)
stipulates that principles ‘shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of
such acts and in the ruling on their legality.’ As will be argued in this article, the
difference between rights and principles in the Charter is not very evident.
*Assistant professor of EU law, Radboud University Nijmegen. I would like to thank
Dr Katarina Eisele, Prof Janneke Gerards, Dr John Morijn, Dr Elise Muir and Prof Henri de Waele
as well as the peer reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. Any errors
obviously remain the sole responsibility of the author.
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The Charter itself does not make a clear distinction. Because member states could
not arrive at a list that categorised each and every provision, the decision was made
to leave it to the Court of Justice to clarify the nature of the Charter’s provisions on
a case-by-case basis. This article will examine whether the Court of Justice has
indeed taken up this task. More speciﬁcally, it addresses the question of to what
extent the Court has made this distinction between rights and principles in its case
law after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and how it has assessed the
distinction’s implications for judicial review.
This question is not solely of theoretical interest. A Charter provision’s
character has implications for the possibilities for individuals to invoke it before
courts. As the quoted part of Article 52(5) shows, principles were meant to have a
more limited justiciability than rights. Hence, if the Court of Justice casts the net
too wide and interprets many provisions as rights, this could lead to – in the words
of critics – a juridiﬁcation of politics, whereby individuals have ample
opportunities to challenge – democratically legitimised – EU and national acts
and measures. These fears are not completely unfounded, as some have argued,
because the Court has shown in the past that it is not afraid of interpreting EU law
in a dynamic and progressive way. A too-broad interpretation could hence result in
an ever more expansive EU fundamental rights system with all concomitant
problems.1 On the other hand, if the Court is too restrictive in its approach, i.e. by
categorising many provisions as mere principles and interpreting the possibilities
for judicial review narrowly, it could leave many individuals with empty hands and
without an effective judicial remedy. This is especially pertinent nowadays in times
of economic crisis and austerity measures.
This article discusses several recent cases in which the Court of Justice dealt
with – or could have dealt with – the distinction between rights and principles.2
These includeDominguez3 (Article 31(1) of the Charter on the right to paid annual
leave), Kamberaj 4 (Article 34(3) on the right to housing assistance), AMS5 (Article
27 on the worker’s right to information and consultation within the undertaking),
Pohotovost6 (Article 38 on consumer protection) and Glatzel 7 (Article 26 on the
1L. Burgorgue-Larsen, ‘Article II-112’ in Burgorgue-Larsen et al. (eds.), Traité établissant une
Constitution pour l’Europe Partie II. La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union. Commentaire
article par article (Bruylant 2005) p. 687.
2These cases were selected because the distinction between rights and principles played a role in
the Opinion of the A.G. (Dominguez, AMS and Pohotovost) or the judgment of the ECJ (Glatzel).
Kamberaj was included because several scholars noted that the provision at play, Art. 34(3), is most
likely a principle. See n. 128 infra.
3ECJ 24 January 2012, Case C-282/10, Dominguez.
4ECJ 24 April 2012, Case C-571/10, Kamberaj.
5ECJ 15 January, Case C-176/12, AMS.
6ECJ 27 February 2014, Case C-470/12, Pohotovost’ s.r.o. v Miroslaw Vašuta.
7ECJ 22 May 2014, Case C-356/12, Glatzel.
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integration of persons with disabilities). These cases are analysed in the light of the
following questions: in what way has the distinction between rights and principles
played a role in these cases and what criteria have been used by the Court or the
Advocate General to make such a distinction? And what has been the implication
of this (lack of) distinction for the review the Court of Justice has conducted
(or has not conducted)?
Before addressing these questions, the second section provides a historical
background to the inclusion of social rights in the Charter. It elaborates on the
debates on and reasons for the introduction of the distinction between rights and
principles. This introductory overview aims to illustrate why the distinction is such
a controversial issue and why it is important for the Court of Justice to take into
account. The third section brieﬂy examines the distinction between Charter
principles and other EU principles, most notably general principles of law, as well
as their relation with social rights. The fourth section discusses how the Charter
and its Explanations8 distinguish between rights and principles. Section ﬁve
reﬂects on the implications of this distinction for the possibility of judicial review.
Then, Section six turns to the analysis of case law in order to answer the central
question of this article.
Background and genesis of social rights in the Charter
The inclusion of principles in the Charter has its origin in the growing concerns in
the 1980s about the potential negative implication for social standards and wages
arising out of the Single European Market and the increased competition between
member states. There were increasing requests to give a ‘social dimension’ to the
European Economic Community in order to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ with
respect to social and labour standards.9 These developments led to the adoption of
the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers
which included several social rights of workers as well as obligations for member
states to realise certain objectives related to social policy and labour law.10 Because
this Charter was – as stated in the preamble – only a political declaration, calls to
draft a legally binding document continued. The 1996 report of the Comité des
8O.J. 2007, C 303/32. The Explanations do not have the ‘status of law’, but they are a ‘valuable
tool of interpretation’ as the preamble of the Charter makes clear as well. Art. 6(1), third sentence
TFEU furthermore provides: ‘The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted
[…] with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter.’ See also Art. 52(7) of the Charter.
9For a description of the history of social rights in the EU, see J. Kenner, ‘Economic and Social
Rights in the EU Legal Order: the Mirage of Indivisibility’, in T.K. Hervey and J. Kenner (eds.),
Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a Legal Perspective (Hart
2003) p. 1 at p. 7-15.
10O.J. 1989, C 323/44.
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Sages, For a Europe of Civic and Social Rights, for instance, urged the adoption of a
‘bill of rights’ which would include both ‘civic and social rights’.11 The Cologne
European Council of June 1999 eventually decided to establish a charter which
would incorporate both categories. The Council noted in particular that: ‘In
drawing up such a Charter, account should furthermore be taken of economic and
social rights as contained in the European Social Charter and the Community
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (Article 136 TEC), insofar
as they do not merely establish objectives for action by the Union’ (emphasis added).12
Especially the last part of the Council’s ‘task’ led to conﬂicting interpretations
during the drafting of the Charter by the First Convention, which took place
between December 1999 and the fall of 2000.13 These conﬂicting interpretations
were essentially based on two diametrically opposed paradigms, which led to
lengthy and complex debates.14
One group of countries, ‘led by’ the UK and also including countries like
Denmark and the Netherlands,15 was opposed to the inclusion of such ‘social
rights’ as legally enforceable claims.16 In the words of the UK government’s
representative on the First Convention, Lord Goldsmith, the UK ‘had to ﬁght
very hard’ in order not to have the Charter include such rights in an overly
intrusive way.17 Especially the recognition of a right to strike in the Charter
11Comité des Sages, For a Europe of Civic and Social Rights (Ofﬁce for Ofﬁcial Publications of the
European Communities 1996) p. 6.
121999/2064(COS) - 04/06/1999.
13Several of the preparatory documents and NGO contributions can be accessed via the
website of the First Convention, <www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm>, visited
3 March 2015.
14 J.P. Jacqué, ‘La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. Aspects juridiques
généraux’, 14 ERLP/REDP (2002) p. 107 at p. 112. O. De Schutter, ‘La garantie des droits et
principes sociaux dans la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union Européenne’, in J. Carlier and
O. De Schutter (eds.), La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union. Son apport à la protection des
droits de l’homme en Europe (Bruylant 2002) p. 117 at p. 118.
15For an overview of the Dutch reservations towards social rights more generally, see
J. Krommendijk, The domestic impact and effectiveness of the process of state reporting under UN
human rights treaties in the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland. Paper pushing or policy prompting?
(Intersentia 2014) p. 154-158.
16G. Braibant, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. Témoignage et
commentaires (Seuil 2001) p. 252. Burgorgue-Larsen, supra n. 1, p. 683. S. Prechal, ‘Rights v.
principles, or how to remove fundamental rights from the jurisdiction of the courts’, in J.W. De
Zwaan et al. (eds.), The European Union: An ongoing process of integration – Liber amicorum Alfred E.
Kellerman (Asser Press 2004) p. 177 at p. 178-179.
17Lord Goldsmith QC, ‘A charter of rights, freedoms and principles’, 38 CML Rev. (2001)
p. 1206 at p. 1212-1213. Jacqué, supra n. 14, p. 112-113. UK representative on the Second
Convention, Peter Hain, likewise argued that the inclusion of social rights could result in the UK’s
‘domestic legislation being disregarded on social matters’. A.G. Menéndez, ‘The sinews of peace:
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(currently Article 28) was opposed from the beginning by the UK.18 This was
based on the idea that the inclusion of such a right and other social rights would be
‘deeply damaging’ for the British economy because it would ‘put jobs at risk and
open the ﬂoodgates to a rash of potentially costly legal challenges’.19 The UK
therefore preferred to treat social rights as mere programmatic or aspirational20
objectives which should be guaranteed by the legislature instead of courts.21
Underlying this point of view is the idea that social rights or principles
would solely require intervention or positive action on the part of the state,
whereas civil and political rights actually protect the individual against a state. UK
representative Lord Goldsmith, for example, argued that social and economic
rights ‘are usually not justiciable individually in the same way as other rights’.22
This reﬂects a reluctance to have the judiciary decide on such broad issues because
of a lack of expertise among judges, but also, and above all, because of the idea that
such decisions should be made by democratically elected governments and
parliament. There was, further, a fear that such social rights or principles would
lead to legal claims with considerable ﬁnancial implications.23 Moreover, it
was considered that that the inclusion of social rights could lead to an unwarranted
extension of EU powers and competences in the ﬁeld of social and economic
policy.24
The second view was primarily expressed by lawyers from the civil law tradition
and left-wing politicians who negated the distinction between ‘civil rights’ and
‘social rights’ or downplayed the importance of this distinction.25 Especially the
French and Spanish governments were keen on including ‘social rights’ in the
rights to solidarity in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, 16 Ratio Juris
(2003) p. 373 at p. 393.
18Braibant, supra n. 16, p. 46.
19The Times, 1 June 2000, p. 4.
20The UK representative during the Second Convention, Rt Hon Baroness Scotland of Asthal,
referred to the ‘aspirational character’ of principles; Working Group II, WD 16, 13 September
2002, p. 4.
21This argument was already visible in the defence of the UK inDefrenne II dealing with equal pay
(Art. 159 TFEU, ex 119 EEC). The UK argued that ‘such a ‘general statement of principle’ primarily
requires legislative action on the part of the Member States’; ECJ, 8 April 1976, Case C-43/75,
Defrenne v Sabena, p. 459-460.
22Goldsmith, supra n. 17, p. 1212.
23UK representative during the Second Convention, Rt Hon Baroness Scotland of Asthal, for
example, regretted Art. 31(2) of the Charter because of its impact on national politics and ﬁnance.
S. Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, ‘Les droits sociaux: droits proclamés ou droits invocables? Un appel à la
vigilance’, in B. Favreau (ed.), La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne après le traité
de Lisbonne (Bruylant 2010) p. 265 at p. 288.
24Goldsmith, supra n. 17, p. 1213. Prechal, supra n. 16, p. 179.
25C. Ladenburger, ‘Artikel 52 Abs. 5’, in P.J. Tettinger and K. Stern (eds.), Kölner Gemeinschafts-
Kommentar Europäische Grundrechte-Charta (Verlag C.H. Beck 2006) para 7.
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Charter for this reason. The representative of the French government to the First
Convention, Guy Braibant, requested the insertion of several social rights in the
Charter because France could not subscribe to a minimal text without them.26
He actively championed the idea of a limited justiciability or ‘justiciabilité
normative’ of social rights.27 This idea was inspired by jurisprudence of the French
Conseil Constitutionnel in which the right of every person to have decent housing
was acknowledged. The existence of such a right was based on the recognition of a
principle of constitutional value (un objectif de nature constitutionelle) derived from
the respect for human dignity.28 In the French system, such principles of
constitutional value are capable of having an interpretive function and allow for a
review of validity of acts.29 This idea of justiciabilité normative was at the centre of
the joint contribution of Braibant and the German Member of Parliament Meyer,
presented as the compromis Braibant-Meyer during the First Convention.30
The inclusion of social rights was also inﬂuenced by the contribution of
the Spanish representative Rodríguez-Bereijo. He proposed a typology of
fundamental rights, ordinary rights and policy clauses.31 This distinction was
based on the Spanish Constitution, with Chapter II on ‘rights and liberties’ and
Chapter III on ‘principles governing economic and social policy’. According to
Article 53(3) of the Spanish Constitution, such principles ‘may only be invoked
before the ordinary courts in accordance with the legal provisions implementing
them’.32
The First Convention eventually agreed to include several ‘social rights’ in the
Charter. The Charter was proclaimed on 7 December 2000 by the Nice European
Council. The concerns of the UK and other countries were partly met by not
granting the Charter legally binding status. In addition, a distinction between
rights and principles was included, based on the above mentioned French idea of
justiciabilité normative and the ideas expressed in the Spanish Constitution. The
distinction was made clear in the Preamble and in Article 51(1) which stipulated
26Braibant, supra n. 16, p. 45. Braibant’s proposal included the current Articles 27, 28, 31(2),
34(3), 36-38. EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, ‘Commentary
of the Charter’, <ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/ﬁles/networkcommentaryﬁnal_en.pdf>,
visited 29 October 2014, at p. 405-406.
27Braibant, supra n. 16, p. 46.
28Burgorgue-Larsen, supra n. 1, p. 684. Jacqué, supra n. 14, p. 114.
29A.G. Cruz-Villalón, Opinion 18 July 2013, Case C-176/12, AMS, para 48.
30CONTRIB 258/4.7.2000, ‘Proposition relative aux droits économiques et sociaux fondamentaux’,
13 June 2000, <ec.europa.eu/dorie/ﬁleDownload.do?docId=8807&cardId=8807>, visited 3 March
2015. Braibant, supra n. 16, p. 45. EU Network, supra n. 26, p. 406.
31CHARTE 4414/00 as referred to in Menéndez, supra n. 17, p. 386.
32See the general report of Seminar of Association of the Councils of State and Supreme
Administrative Jurisdictions held in the Hague on 24 November 2011, <www.aca-europe.eu/
images/media_kit/seminars/DenHaag2011/Gen_Report_en.pdf>, visited 22 July 2014, para E9.
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that EU institutions and members states ‘shall respect … rights, observe the
principles and promote the application thereof…’.33
The Second Convention was set up in December 2001 on the basis of the
Laeken Declaration on the Future of Europe and was entrusted with the task of
coming up with a proposal for institutional reforms to make the EU more
democratic, transparent and effective.34 Discussions quickly focused on drafting a
Constitution for the EU as well as on the status of the Charter and its inclusion in
EU law. The UK argued that the distinction was unclear and criticised the legal
uncertainty created as a result of the lack of assignment of the provisions in the
Charter to the two categories.35 The UK only agreed with the inclusion of the
Charter in the draft Constitution on the condition that the distinction between
rights and principles was further clariﬁed. The Working Group II therefore
‘conﬁrmed’ the distinction by adding Article 52(5) for reasons of ‘legal
certainty’.36 Article 52(5) stipulates that principles ‘shall be judicially cognisable
only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.’ Several
members of the Working Group at the same time quickly added that these
additions ‘do not reﬂect modiﬁcations of substance’, but rather ‘conﬁrm, and
render absolutely clear and legally watertight, certain key elements’.37 Be that as it
may, the additional clariﬁcation in Article 52(5) was an ‘important element’ or
‘indispensable ingredient’ which made inclusion of the Charter in the
Constitution possible.38 Thus, Article 52(5) acted as a ‘political lubricant’.39
When the Constitution was replaced by the Lisbon Treaty, the UK undertook
another attempt together with Poland to emphasise and conﬁrm the distinction by
including Article 1(2) in Protocol 30 on the application of the Charter to Poland
and to the United Kingdom. This Article stipulates: ‘In particular, and for the
avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights
applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the
United Kingdom have provided for such rights in its national law.’40
33CONV 354/02, ‘Final Report of Working Group II’, p. 8. C. Ladenburger, ‘Protection of
Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon’, FIDE 2012, <www.ﬁde2012.eu/index.php?doc_id=88>,
visited 28 April 2014, p. 31.
34Almost all the preparatory and negotiation documents can be accessed via <european-
convention.europa.eu/>, visited 3 March 2015.
35Ladenburger, supra n. 25, para 7.
36CONV 354/02, supra n. 33, p. 8.
37 Ibid., p. 4.
38 Ibid., p. 8. Ladenburger, supra n. 25, para 7 and 10.
39Prechal, supra n. 17, p. 179.
40The question as to whether this Protocol has any legal implications is much contested. The ECJ
interpreted the legal implications of Art. 1(1) Protocol restrictively and argued that it ‘does not
intend to exempt the Republic of Poland or the United Kingdom from the obligation to comply
with the provisions of the Charter’. The ECJ did not give any interpretation of Art. 1(2) or the rest of
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This section showed that the inclusion of social rights in the Charter was a
controversial matter which could only be realised through making a distinction
between rights and – weaker and less judicially cognisable – principles.
Distinction between founding principles, general principles
of EU law and social rights
Before turning to the distinction between rights and principles, a brief overview
should be given of the distinction between Charter principles and three other
categories of ‘principles’ in EU law. What distinguishes the three categories of
principles discussed here from the principles in the sense of Article 52(5) of the
Charter is the former’s fundamental nature, while Article 52(5) principles have a
weaker legal status (see next sections).41 First of all, there are the ‘founding
principles’ of the EU. These can primarily be found in Title I TEU and include,
for example, the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) and the
principle of supremacy of EU law.42 The second subset includes the ‘general
principles of EU law’. Within this group, a distinction can be made between
‘ordinary’ general principles of EU law, such as the principle of proportionality,
and general principles which relate to fundamental rights, such as the prohibition
of torture or non-discrimination in respect of age.43 General principles of EU law
have ‘constitutional status’, as the Court of Justice held in Audiolux.44 Given
their constitutional status, general principles have a much stronger effect than
the Protocol, since the rights invoked in the proceedings did not deal with Title IV of the Charter.
ECJ 21 December 2011, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S and M.E., para 116-122. See
also A.G. Kokott, Opinion 15 December 2011, Case C-489/10, Bonda, para 21-23. S. Peers, ‘The
“Opt-out” that Fell to Earth: The British and Polish Protocol Concerning the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights’, 14HRLR (2012) p. 1. C. Barnard, ‘EU “social” policy: from employment law
to labour market reform’, in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The evolution of EU law (Oxford
University Press 2011) p. 641 at p. 659.
41The ECJ already held in Defrenne that ‘this term [principle] is speciﬁcally used in order to
indicate the fundamental nature of certain provisions’. Defrenne, supra n. 21, para 26. The changed
use of principles in Art. 52(5) is thus ‘somewhat paradoxical’, as Prechal has noted, because the
protection of fundamental rights in the EU legal order actually began by way of reference to general
principles of law. Prechal, supra n. 16, p. 178 and 184. See text between n. 96 and 99 infra.
42A. Von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles of EU Law: A theoretical and doctrinal sketch’, 16 ELJ
2 (2010) p. 95.
43ECJ 17 February 2009, Case C-465/07, Elgafaji, para 28. ECJ 19 January 2010, Case C-555/
07, Kücükdeveci, para 21. S. Peers and S. Prechal, ‘Article 52’, in S. Peers et al. (eds.), The EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights – A Commentary (Hart 2014), para 52.163.
44The ECJ did not accept that equality of shareholders was a general principle because it does not
entail ‘the general, comprehensive character which is otherwise naturally inherent in general
principle of law’. ECJ 15 October 2009, Case C-101/08, Audiolux SA ea v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert
SA (GBL), para 42 and 63. A.G. Trstenjak noted that general principles imply ‘fundamental
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Charter principles. They have horizontal effect in as much as they can directly be
relied upon by applicants even in disputes between private parties, as was
conﬁrmed in Mangold and Kücükdeveci.45 It is difﬁcult to imagine that principles
in the sense of Article 52(5) of the Charter, that cannot be directly relied upon, are
classiﬁed as general principles.46 Thirdly, there are what the Court has referred to
as ‘particularly important principles of EU social law’. The Court of Justice
introduced this concept in BECTU and qualiﬁed the entitlement of every worker
to paid annual leave as such.47 In order to underline the important nature of these
principles, the Court has referred to their unconditional character and held that
‘there can be no derogations’ from such principles.48
Arguably there is also a close relationship between social rights and principles in
the sense of Article 52(5), as the previous section illustrated by looking at the
inclusion of social rights in the Charter. Indeed, several social rights have the
character of such Charter principles. Nonetheless, principles should not be equated
with social rights. Two of the three examples of principles given in the Explanations
(Articles 25 and 26) are actually provisions which are not in Chapter IV on
solidarity, which is generally seen as the social rights section of the Charter.49 In
addition, many Charter provisions in the social sphere are clearly individually
enforceable rights as the Court determined in a few instances as well.50 This includes
the landmark cases ofViking and Laval on the right to take collective action, which is
laid down in Article 28 of the Charter.51 Thus, given these considerations, the
Charter principles should not be equated with social rights.
principles’ because of their hierarchical status as primary law; A.G.Trstenjak in Audiolux, para 66, 70
and 74.
45The ECJ ruled that the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age as given
expression by Directive 2000/78, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation; ECJ 19
January 2010, Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, para 43.
46Note that Art. 6(3) TEU stipulates that general principles of EU law are still a separate source of
fundamental rights in addition to the rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter. This means that
the Charter principles exist alongside – and must thus be distinguished from – the general principles
of EU law encompassing fundamental rights. See alsoN. Lazzerini, ‘(Some of) the fundamental rights
granted by the Charter may be a course of obligations for private parties: AMS’, 51 CML Rev. (2014)
p. 907 at p. 932. See also A.G. Kokott, Opinion 12 March 2015, Case C-83/14, CHEZ
Razpredelenie Bulgaria ED, para 144.
47ECJ 26 June 2001, Case C-173/99, BECTU, para 40.
48 Ibid., para 43. Text to n. 126 infra.
49Art. 25 (the rights of the elderly) and 26 (integration of persons with disabilities).
50K. Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the limits of the EU Charter of fundamental rights’, 8 EuConst (2012)
p. 375 at p. 399. R. O’Gorman, ‘The ECHR, the EU and the weakness of social rights protection at
the European level’, 12 GLJ (2011) p. 1833 at p. 1835-1836. S. Fredman, ‘Transformation or
dilution: fundamental rights in the EU social space’, 12 ELJ (2006) p. 41 at p. 42.
51ECJ 11 December 2007, Case C-438/05, Viking, para 44. ECJ 18 December 2007,
Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, para 91. For subsequent cases on Article 28, see ECJ
329The role of the EU Charter’s principles in the case law of the Court of Justice
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019615000164
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteitsbibliotheek Nijmegen, on 18 Jul 2017 at 09:32:42, subject to the Cambridge Core
In conclusion, this short analysis shows that the notion of ‘principles’ in Article
52(5) should be clearly distinguished from general principles of EU law and
‘particularly important principles of EU social law’ as well as social rights.
Distinction between rights and principles in the Charter
The precise difference between rights and principles is not obvious. No clear
distinction is, for example, made in the text of the Charter itself, to the extent that
principles are not contained in speciﬁc provisions or in a separate chapter. Most,
but certainly not all, principles are included in Chapter IV on solidarity. This
chapter at the same time includes rights, while there are also principles in other
chapters.52 The language used in the Charter is not always indicative either. Only
three provisions actually include the word ‘principle’, but it is evident that the
Charter contains more principles.53 The other way around, the title of Article 49,
for example, refers to ‘principles of legality and proportionality of criminal
offences and penalties’ even though these are not principles in the sense of Article
52(5) Charter.54
The Explanations to the Charter provide some clarity by mentioning the
following: ‘For illustration, examples for principles, recognised in the Charter
include e.g. Articles 25, 26 and 37.’55 The Explanations also explicitly mention
that several provisions lay down principles, including Articles 26, 34(1) and
35-38. The Explanations are, however, not consistent either, even though
the Praesidium of the Second Convention tried to ‘cleanse’ the text of the
Explanations drafted during the First Convention by making sure that the
references to principles related to the distinction made in Article 52(5).56
The Explanations, for example, refer to ‘the principles of Article 3 of the Charter’
in relation to the ‘right’ to integrity of the person.57 In relation to the right to
education laid down in Article 14, the Explanations mention ‘the principle of free
compulsory education’.58 The Explanations also complicate the making of a
15 July 2010, Case C-271/08, Commission v Germany. ECJ 8 September 2011, Joined Cases C-297/10
and C-298/10, Hennings and Mai.
52Text to n. 49-50 supra. M. Gijzen, ‘The Charter: A milestone for social protection in Europe’,
8 MJ (2001) p. 33 at p. 38. Kenner, supra n. 9, p. 17.
53Art. 23 (principle of equality), 37 (sustainable development) and 47 (legality and
proportionality of criminal offences and penalties).
54Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 32. Prechal, supra n. 16, p. 182.
55O.J. 2007, C 303/35.
56CHARTE 4473/00, ‘Text of the explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter as set
out in CHARTE 4487/00 CONVENT 50’, 11 October 2000.
57 Ibid., p. 2.
58 Ibid., p. 6.
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distinction between rights and principles by stipulating that ‘in some cases, an
Article of the Charter may contain both elements of a right and of a principle, e.g.
Articles 23, 33 and 34’.59
The absence of a clear distinction in the Charter is primarily the result of the
inability of the two Conventions mentioned earlier to arrive at a consensus on a list
distinguishing between rights and principles. The UK government, for example,
wanted the Explanations to label more provisions of the Charter as principles than
other member states.60 Given the disagreement, it was eventually decided to leave
it to the Court of Justice to clarify the nature of the Charter’s provisions on a case-
by-case basis.61 Several scholars have rightly pointed out that a labelling of
provisions is undesirable or counterproductive.62 The choice to leave it to judges in
future cases, ﬁrstly, reﬂects that a categorisation of provisions is difﬁcult to be
made in the abstract and a priori.63 Making such a distinction is not a black-and-
white issue either, but clearly depends upon the context.64 This is well illustrated
by the example given by Prechal about Article 15 on the freedom to choose an
occupation and the right to engage in work. She argued that this provision cannot
be invoked as a basis for action for damages in the case of unemployment, but it
can be relied upon when the exercise of an occupation is made almost impossible
or when access to certain professions is unreasonably limited.65 Secondly, the
choice to leave it to the judiciary acknowledges that a distinction is not necessarily
ﬁxed in time and could change as a result of societal, legal and political
developments.66
Scholars and politicians have formulated several criteria to distinguish between
rights and principles, which echo the famous direct effect criteria of being
‘unconditional and sufﬁciently clear and precise’.67 These criteria take the wording
59O.J. 2007, C 303/35.
60Art. 21, 23, 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34(3) should refer to ‘principles’ or Art. 52(5). Contribution
of the Rt Hon Baroness Scotland of Asthal QC, Working Group II, WD 28, 12 June 2003.
61CONV 354/02, supra n. 33, p. 8. Lenaerts, supra n. 50, p. 400.
62Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, supra n. 23, p. 315.
63The Final Report of the Working Group II, nonetheless, talked about the ‘exact attribution of
Articles to the two categories’; CONV 354/02, supra n. 33, p. 8. Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 31.
Burgorgue-Larsen, supra n. 1, p. 687. Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.183.
64Prechal, supra n. 16, p. 182-183. M. De Mol et al., ‘Inroepbaarheid in rechte van het Handvest
van de Grondrechten van de Europese Unie: Toepassingsgebied en het onderscheid tussen “rechten”
en “beginselen’, 60 SEW (2012) p. 222 at p. 232.
65Prechal, supra n. 16, p. 182.
66K. Lenaerts, ‘La solidarité ou le chapitre IV de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union
Européenne’, 82 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'homme (2010) para 43.
67Ladenburger, supra n. 25, para 98. ACA report, supra n. 32, para E10. T. Von Danwitz,
‘Questionnaire’, <aca-europe.eu/seminars/DenHaag2011/Report_ECJ.pdf>, visited 28 April
2014, para E3.
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of the text of the provisions in the Charter as the starting point, while the Explanations
are subsequently used as a way to discern the object and purpose of the provision.68
The rest of this section discusses three yardsticks as well as their (practical)
limitations.69 This overview aims to illustrate that the criteria are not decisive on their
own and that there are limitations to their practical application in concrete cases.
The ﬁrst and most cited criterion boils down to the question as to whether
the provision actually aims to protect the rights of individuals. Former EU
Commissioner Antonio Vitorino, who was the European Commission
representative to the First Convention drafting the Charter, argued rather
succinctly that there is a right ‘where the holder is clearly designated and that there
is a principle where the EU is referred to as having to respect or recognize a speciﬁc
value such as a healthy environment or protection of consumers’.70 Thus, it is
more likely that a provision is a right when it explicitly endows an individual with a
subjective entitlement or claim (referring to rights) or when it speciﬁcally
stipulates clear-cut obligations towards an individual, such as Article 2(2) of the
Charter.71 For example, the use of the terms ‘shall’ in Article 33(1) and ‘right’ in
Article 33(2) seem to indicate that these provisions are rights instead of
principles.72 When a provision only outlines certain desirable objectives or
obligations on the part of EU institutions and member states, such as the second
part of Article 35, it is more likely that it is a principle. The second part of Article
35 provides: ‘A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the
deﬁnition and implementation of all the Union’s policies and activities.’ Other
phrases which primarily reﬂect a principled nature use the following terminology:
‘The Union recognises and respects…’ (Articles 25-26, 34(1), 34(3) and 36),
‘…must be integrated into the policies of the Union’ (Article 37 on environmental
protection), ‘Union policies shall ensure…’ (Article 38 on consumer protection).
Because these provisions are worded as objective norms which are exclusively
addressed to the state and avoid any reference to ‘right’ or ‘individual’, they
are most likely principles.73 There are, however, several grey areas. Articles 25 and
68Von Danwitz, supra n. 67, para E3. Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.170.
69Another criterion deals with the origin of a Charter provision. It has been argued that the
provisions which correspond to the ECHR should be qualiﬁed as rights, even when they are broadly
formulated. The Explanations to Art. 52(3) outline Charter provisions with a similar meaning and
the scope as in the ECHR. O.J. 2007, C 303/32, 17-18. Ladenburger gave the examples of Art. 9, 48
and 49, which are formulated in an objective way, but qualify as rights because they correspond to
the ECHR. Ladenburger, supra n. 25, para 98.
70Vitorino as quoted in P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty. Law, politics, and treaty reform (Oxford
University Press 2010) p. 217.
71 ‘No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed’.
72 Interventions of Schoo, Piris and Petit on 23 July 2002, Working Group II, WD 13,
5 September 2002, p. 22.
73Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 32.
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26, for instance, are mentioned as examples of principles in the Explanations and
include the above-mentioned sentence of ‘The Union recognises and respects’, yet
at the same time contain the word ‘rights’. The other way around, a Charter
provision might have connotations of a right (in the sense of a droit subjectif ) even
though it is broadly formulated. One example is Article 22 of the Charter: ‘The
Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’. This Article is
closely related to Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which has been interpreted by the UN Human Rights Committee as
having direct effect and being justiciable in the sense of giving individuals the
possibility to invoke the provision before the Committee.74
A second – closely related – yardstick is the extent to which the protection of
fundamental rights depends upon further concretisation in laws.75 Rights
generally do not depend upon legislative implementation and concretisation,
while principles do.76 This can be illustrated by Article 37, which stipulates that
‘[a] high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of
the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in
accordance with the principle of sustainable development.’ Clearly, this Article
does not immediately offer any entitlements, but merely lays down a broad
obligation of effort requiring further implementation. Nonetheless, rights may be
formulated in abstract or broad terms and may need further (legislative)
concretisation and sometimes also positive action. The latter was also noted by
Advocate General Trstenjak in Dominguez, who argued that rights are always
worded to some extent in ‘a legally abstract fashion’ and ‘are often designed to be
ﬂeshed out’.77
A third criterion identiﬁed in the literature relates to the margin of discretion a
Charter provision leaves for the duty bearers, in particular the authorities of the
EU institutions and member states. These duty bearers are said to have a larger
margin of discretion when it comes to principles.78 This margin of discretion can
be derived from references to conditions provided by Union law and/or national
laws and practices.79 Article 30, for example, stipulates: ‘Every worker has the right
to protection against unjustiﬁed dismissal, in accordance with Union law and
national laws and practices.’ The problem, however, with this criterion is that this
conditional language is also used in relation to several rights in Chapter II on
freedoms, such as the right to marry and the right to found a family (Article 9) and
74Krommendijk, supra n. 15, p. 348.
75De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 232.
76Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 32-33.
77A.G. Trstenjak, Opinion 8 September 2011, Case C-282/10, Dominguez, para 78.
78De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 232.
79Such references are made in the following Charter provisions: 9, 10(2), 14(3), 16, 27, 28, 30,
34(1), (2) and (3), 35 and 36.
333The role of the EU Charter’s principles in the case law of the Court of Justice
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019615000164
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteitsbibliotheek Nijmegen, on 18 Jul 2017 at 09:32:42, subject to the Cambridge Core
the freedom to found educational establishments (Article 14(3)). In addition, the
Court of Justice has not shied away from attaching direct effect to provisions of
primary and secondary EU law that include such references to limitations and
conditions. In Baumbast, for instance, the Court concluded that Article 21 TFEU
constitutes a directly effective right, despite references in that Article to the
limitations and conditions that could be laid down in EU secondary law.80
Likewise, the Court determined in Viking and Laval that ‘the right to take
collective action, including the right to strike, must … be recognised as a
fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles of
Community law’. It did do so despite the fact that the corresponding provision in
the Charter, Article 28, which was used as a reafﬁrmation of this right, refers to
‘Union law and national laws and practices’ as well.81
In sum, the text of the Charter and the Explanations do not make an
unambiguous distinction between rights and principles. Rather, the idea was to
leave it to the Court of Justice to determine a provision’s status on a case-by-case
basis. Scholars and politicians have, nonetheless, developed several criteria which
could help in making this distinction and structuring the Court’s analysis, even
though they do not, as such, provide any deﬁnite certainty. Section 6, which
discusses the recent case law of the Court of Justice, examines whether these
criteria have also been used by the Court. Before that, the question will be
addressed of why the distinction between rights and principles is relevant.
Implications of the distinction for judicial review
Article 51(1), which was already included in the Charter by the First Convention
before Article 52(5) was inserted by the Second Convention, stipulates that ‘they
[institutions and bodies of the Union and Member States] shall therefore respect
the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof’. At ﬁrst
glance, it seems that the obligation to ‘observe’ the principles is weaker than the
obligation to ‘respect’ the rights.82 Nevertheless, this explanation is not a very
convincing one. Several scholars have argued that the two verbs are synonyms
and difﬁcult to distinguish.83 The ordinary meaning of ‘observe’ is ‘to obey a
law, rule, or custom’, ‘to do what you are supposed to do according to a law
or agreement [= obey]’ or to ‘fulﬁl or comply with (a social, legal, ethical, or
80ECJ 17 September 2002, Case C-413/99, Baumbast, para 86.
81ECJ 11 December 2007, Case C-438/05, Viking, para 44. ECJ 18 December 2007, Case
C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, para 91.
82A.W. Heringa and L. Verhey, ‘The EU Charter: text and structure’, 8 MJ 1 (2001) p. 11
at p. 14.
83Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, supra n. 23, p. 297. J. Tooze, ‘Social security and social assistance’,
in Hervey and Kenner, supra n. 9, p. 161 at p. 163
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religious obligation).’84 Observing principles thus does not seem fundamentally
different from respecting rights.85 Article 51 thus does not shed much light on the
legal implications of the distinction.
The legal implications of the difference between rights and principles are
spelled out more clearly in Article 52(5), which implies that judicial review should
be more limited in respect of principles. Article 52(5) stipulates: ‘The provisions of
this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and
executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, ofﬁces and agencies of the Union, and
by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise
of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the
interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.’ This Article is,
however, not very clear and can be interpreted in different ways. Several authors
have differentiated between two possible interpretations.86 The ﬁrst interpretation
is based on a narrow textual interpretation of the wording of Article 52(5) and
holds that judicial review of principles is limited to acts which give explicit
expression to a principle. This is based on the last sentence of Article 52(5), which
mentions that principles ‘shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of
such acts and in the ruling on their legality’ (emphasis added). ‘Such acts’ refers to
the acts mentioned in the previous sentence: ‘Legislative and executive acts taken
by institutions, bodies, ofﬁces and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member
States when they are implementing Union law’. The Explanations further clarify
that: ‘Principles may be implemented through legislative or executive acts
(adopted by the Union in accordance with its powers, and by the Member States
only when they implement Union law); accordingly, they become signiﬁcant for
the courts only when such acts are interpreted or reviewed.’ Judicial review seems
thus limited to acts that explicitly and speciﬁcally aim to implement a Charter
principle. The Explanations make clear that the limited judicial review to acts
implementing principles is consistent with the case law of the Court of Justice as it
stood when the Charter was drafted.87
The interpretation that principles can only be reviewed when there is an
implementing measure is problematic, however, for several reasons. First of all, the
Court has not limited its review to mere implementing acts of the principles
mentioned in the Explanations.88 For example, the precautionary principle has
84These quotes are from the online dictionaries of Cambridge, Longman and Oxford.
85This was also noted by A.G Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 29, para 46.
86EU Network, supra n. 26, p. 407. De Mol et al, supra n. 64.
87 In particular, reference is made here to case law on the ‘precautionary principle’, as laid down in
Art. 191(2) TFEU and on Art. 33 TFEU related to the principles of agricultural law, including the
principle of market stabilisation and of reasonable expectations. See respectively, CFI 11 September
2002, Case T-13/99, Pﬁzer v Council; ECJ 11 March 1987, Case C-265/85, Van den Berg.
88De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 234. Craig, supra n. 70, p. 220-221.
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been given a more autonomous reading and has been directly used as a standard
of review in the recent case law of the Court of Justice and the General
Court, although there was no reference to the principle in the (implementing)
measure in question.89 Principles thus have a function beyond the one envisaged
in the Explanations. The Court of First Instance, for instance, held in
Artegodan that even though ‘the precautionary principle is mentioned in the
Treaty only in connection with environmental policy, it is broader in scope’.
It implied that the principle can be an autonomous general principle of EU law
which can be used as a standard of review in other areas such as public health and
safety.90
Secondly, the narrow and literal interpretation has also been questioned
from the perspective of the effet utile of EU law. A restrictive interpretation
would prevent judicial review of clear violations of principles when the EU or
member states fail or refuse to take action or when there are no measures that
speciﬁcally aim to implement a speciﬁc principle.91 Ladenburger referred to such a
reading as having ‘absurd results’ and he noted that this would also go against the
intention of the drafters during the First Convention.92 He suggested that ‘such
acts’ merely refers to the categories of acts, i.e. either legislative or executive acts,
which can be judicially reviewed. Ladenburger referred to the Abdulla case for
support. In this case, the Court held that the provisions in the 2004 asylum
Qualiﬁcation Directive, which were not speciﬁcally adopted with a view to
implement certain Charter provisions, must ‘be interpreted in a manner which
respects the fundamental rights and the principles recognised in particular by the
Charter’ (emphasis added).93 Prechal also noted that the strict interpretation
would be a ‘serious drawback’ in comparison with the earlier protection of
fundamental rights by the Court of Justice where no such distinction was made.
Pointing to ERT, she noted that all EU acts and national acts and measures
falling within the scope of Community law can in principle be, and have in
89Prechal, supra n. 16, p. 183. The CFI held: ‘It is not disputed by the parties that the
[precautionary] principle also applies where the Community institutions take, in the framework of
the common agricultural policy, measures to protect human health’. Pﬁzer, supra n. 87 , para 114
and 125. Hilson, for example, pointed to ECJ 9 September 2003, Case C-236/01, Monsanto; ECJ
16 April 1991, Case C-290/90, Commission v Belgium; ECJ 29 April 1999, Case C-293/97,
Standley. C. Hilson, ‘Rights and principles in EU law: a distinction without foundation’, 15 MJ
(2008) p. 192 at p. 199-202.
90CFI 26 November 2002, Case T-74/00, Artegodan, para 182 and 184. Hilson, supra n. 89,
p. 199.
91Lenaerts, supra n. 50, p. 400. Burgorgue-Larsen, supra n. 1, p. 687-688. Peers and Prechal,
supra n. 43, para 52.182.
92Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 33.
93ECJ 2 March 2010, Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Abdulla and
others, para 51 and 54.
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practice been, tested against fundamental rights irrespective of whether
they intend to implement fundamental rights.94 In fact, the Court has held
that ‘respect of fundamental rights is a condition of the legality of Community
acts’.95
In light of these problems, the majority of commentators favour a second
interpretation of Article 52(5), which limits judicial review on the basis of
principles to the way in which the review is conducted by courts.96 Review is
limited in the sense that principles cannot give rise to ‘direct claims for positive
action by the Union’s institutions or Member States authorities’ or create standing
before EU or national courts.97 The Final Report of the Working Group II of the
Second Convention noted in this context that ‘principles are different from
subjective rights’.98 In other words, principles cannot act as a ‘sword’ or ‘épée’ (as a
source of a new right).99
Nonetheless, principles can have a judicial function beyond this traditional
narrow understanding of direct effect, since they can act as a shield or bouclier and
offer protection against conﬂicting Community or national norms. Principles are
limited to the extent that they cannot create locus standi for the individual, but
when a litigant has standing on the basis of another ground than the principle, a
judge can strike down a legislative or executive act on the basis of a principle in the
Charter.100 Principles can thus be used as standards for legality review or tools of
interpretation. This twofold function corresponds to the earlier discussed French
tradition of ‘limited justiciability’ or justiciabilité mediate where principles can
have an ‘exclusionary effect’ or invocabilité d’exclusion and exclude the application
of a conﬂicting national or Community norm.101 This broader understanding of
the possibilities for judicial review of principles also corresponds with more
94ECJ 18 June 1991, Case C-260/89 ERT, para 42. Prechal, supra n. 16, 179. Peers and Prechal,
supra n. 43, para 52.182.
95ECJ 17 February 1998, Case C-249/96, Grant, para 45. ECJ 9 September 2003, Case
C-25/02, Rinke, para 26.
96EU Network, supra n. 26, p. 407. H.M. Sagmeister, Die Grundsatznormen in der Europäischen
Grundrechtecharta (Duncker & Humblot 2010) p. 181 and 265-267. Braibant, supra n. 16, p. 46.
Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulis, supra n. 23, p. 292. Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.181-182.
97O.J. 2007, C 303/32, 19. Ladenburger, supra n. 25, para 86.
98CONV 354/02, supra n. 33, p. 8.
99The limited possibilities for judicial review reﬂects the idea that a provision of EU law can only
produce an independent effect (within national legal systems) after it has satisﬁed the criteria of
direct effect. This is what Dougan referred to as the ‘trigger model’. M. Dougan, ‘When worlds
collide! Competing visions of the relationship between direct effect and supremacy’, 44 CML Rev.
(2007) p. 931 at p. 934-937.
100Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 33. EU Network, supra n. 27, p. 406.
101See text between n. 28 and 31 supra. Lenaerts, supra n. 50, p. 400-401. Von Danwitz, supra n.
67, para E4. B. De Witte, ‘Direct effect, primacy, and the nature of the legal order’, in P. Craig and
G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 323 at p. 331.
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expansive readings of the notion of direct effect.102 These readings posit that a
provision of EU law can have independent ‘exclusionary effects’ independently of
the principle of direct effect when there is a provision of national law that is
incompatible with this provision of EU law.103 They treat the primacy or
supremacy of EU law as the dominant concept governing the relationship between
EU law and national law.104
The broader interpretation is also in line with the case law, cited in the
Explanations, in which the Court has ruled on the legality of acts and has set aside
legislation that was not in conformity with the principle. In Pﬁzer, the Court of
First Instance, for example, tested the conformity of a Regulation with the
precautionary principle.105 The Court has not been precluded from reviewing the
legality of national acts in the light of imprecise and insufﬁciently clear EU norms
in other cases as well.106 In Kraaijeveld, for example, the Court dealt with rather
broadly formulated provisions in the Environmental Impact Assessment
Directive. It held that the fact that member states had certain discretion did ‘not
preclude judicial review of the question whether the national authorities exceeded
their discretion’.107 The Commentary of the EU Network of Experts also noted
that the broader second interpretation would be more faithful to the intention of
102De Witte noted that direct effect has originally been construed as the creation of rights for
individuals, but has over time been replaced by the notion of invocability, whereby a norm can act as
a standard for review of the legality if it is ‘sufﬁciently operational in itself to be applied by a court’;
De Witte, supra n. 101, p. 330-331. Likewise, Prechal highlights the application of a provision of
EU law ‘either as a norm which governs the case or as a standard for legal review’ as the deﬁning
feature of the broader concept of direct effect; S. Prechal, ‘Direct effect, indirect effect, supremacy
and the evolving Constitution of the European Union’, in C. Barnard (ed.), The fundamentals of EU
law revisited (Oxford University Press 2007) p. 35 at p. 37-38. For a further discussion of the
different understandings of direct effect, see E. Muir, ‘Of ages in – and edges of – EU law’, 48 CML
Rev. (2011) p. 39.
103Concrete expressions of these broader readings are the doctrines of indirect effect, the duty of
consistent or harmonious interpretation for national courts, and incidental horizontal effect. The
ECJ, for example, explicitly determined that judicial review is not precluded even if the provisions do
not have direct effect; ECJ 9 October 2001, Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v European
Parliament/ Council, para 54. Likewise, the ECJ held in Pupino that the exclusion of direct effect of
(framework) decisions in the former third pillar did not preclude consistent interpretation; ECJ 16
June 2005, Case C-105/03, Pupino. De Witte, supra n. 101, p. 337. For a good overview, see
P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), EU Law. Text, cases, and materials (Oxford University Press 2011)
p. 200-211.
104Dougan labeled this as the ‘primacy model’ as opposed to the ‘trigger model’. Dougan, supra n.
99, p. 932-933.
105De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 234.
106De Witte referred in this context to ECJ 24 April 2008, Cases C-55/07 and C-56/07, Othmar
Michaeler and others; De Witte, supra n. 101, p. 332. See also n. 103 supra.
107This case dealt with Art. 2(1) of Directive 85/337. ECJ 24 October 1996, Case C-72/95,
Kraaijeveld, para 59.
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the drafters of the First Convention.108 Likewise, the representative of the French
government to the First Convention, Guy Braibant, argued that Article 52(5),
read in conjunction with Article 53, would make it possible to strike down EU or
national measures that conﬂict with principles.109 Even the UK representative
during the First Convention, Lord Goldsmith, recognised ‘that the Union should
not violate this principle by a side wind in some other legislation within its
competence’.110
In summary, it can be argued that the main difference between rights and
principles is that the latter cannot create standing or give rise to direct claims for
positive action before courts. Nonetheless, it is submitted that both rights and
principles can be used as judicial standards for legality review of EU and national
acts and measures, as well as standards or tools of interpretation. One limitation
for Charter principles, however, is that the intensity of the review of acts and
practices is generally more limited than rights.111
Recent case law of the Court of Justice
The previous sections showed that the distinction between rights and principles
received much attention during the negotiations of the Charter and has been
extensively discussed in literature as well. The question remains as to whether this
distinction has also played an important role in the case law of the Court. In order
to answer this question, this section discusses some recent cases decided by the
ECJ which dealt with (Glatzel ) or could have dealt with the distinction
(Dominguez, Kamberaj, AMS and Pohotovost). The analysis will primarily focus
on the criteria used to make a distinction and the implications of this (lack of )
distinction for the review the Court has conducted (or not).
Article 31(2): Dominguez and Heimann
Until the Glatzel case, the Court did not expressly deal with the distinction
between rights and principles in the Charter. One of the ﬁrst opportunities it
could have done so was Dominguez. Ms Dominguez claimed 22.5 days of paid
leave from her employer for the 14-month period she had been absent from work
after an accident. The case touched upon the interpretation of Article 31(2), on the
108EU Network, supra n. 26, 406. De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 234.
109Burgorgue-Larsen, supra n. 1, p. 684 and 687.
110Goldsmith, supra n. 17, p. 1213.
111This also corresponds to the approach of the ECJ in relation to the precautionary principle
where it held that the Community institutions have a broad discretion. Pﬁzer, supra n. 87, para
166-170. De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 235. Craig, supra n. 70, p. 220. Von Danwitz, supra n. 67,
para E4. Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.183.
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right to paid annual leave, and its horizontal direct effect.112 Strikingly, in its
judgment the Court did not refer to the Charter at all, even though it had
requested the parties during the proceedings before the Grand Chamber to focus
on horizontal direct effect and Article 31(2) of the Charter in their pleadings.113
It merely held that the entitlement of every worker to paid annual leave is
‘a particularly important principle of European Union social law from which there
can be no derogations’ and that ‘[Member States] are not entitled to make the very
existence of that right subject to any preconditions whatsoever’.114 The Court then
ruled that national provisions or practices, which make entitlement to paid annual
leave conditional on a minimum period of ten days’ or one month’s actual work
during the reference period, are contrary to the Directive.115
Two issues deserve special attention. Firstly, it is interesting to see how the
Court dealt with the reference to discretion of member states, which relates to the
third criterion for making a distinction between rights and principles. Article 7(1)
of the EU Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC stipulates that ‘Member States
shall take the measures necessary to ensure that every worker is entitled to paid
annual leave of at least four weeks in accordance with the conditions for entitlement
to, and granting of, such leave laid down by national legislation and/or practice’
(emphasis added). This conditional language was no reason for the Court to rule
that Article 7(1) is merely an aspirational norm. The Court held that even though
Member States have some freedom to apply the requirements of the relevant
Directive (2003/88/EC) in practice, they cannot ‘exclude the very existence of a
right expressly granted to all workers’.116
Secondly, the Court used several terms interchangeably, referring to the
‘entitlement of every worker’, ‘the right to paid annual leave’ as well as a ‘principle
of European Union social law’. Thus, the Court far from clariﬁed the precise status
of this right or principle. In addition, it remained unclear whether the ‘principle of
European Union social law’ should be seen as the same as a ‘principle’ in the sense
112Art. 31(2) stipulates: ‘Every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to
daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave.’
113This contrasts with two earlier judgments in which the ECJ made a passing reference to
Art. 31(2). ECJ 15 September 2011, Case C-155/10, Williams, para 18; ECJ 22 November 2011,
Case C-214/10, KHS, para 37. Nonetheless, the ECJ failed to refer to Art. 31(2) in ECJ 14 October
2010, Case C-243/09, Fuß; ECJ 22 April 2010, Case C-486/08, Zentralbetriebsrat der
Landeskrankenhäuser Tirols.
114Dominguez, supra n. 3, para 16 and 18. In this context, the ECJ referred to BECTU,
supra n. 47.
115 Ibid., para 21.
116 Ibid., para 18 and 19. This is in line with the earlier case law of the ECJ. In Jaeger, the ECJ held:
‘the fact that the deﬁnition of the concept of working time refers to “national law and/or practice”
does not mean that the Member States may unilaterally determine the scope of that concept.’ ECJ
9 September 2003, Case C-151/02, Jaeger, para 59. See also: BECTU, supra n. 47, para 53.
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of Article 52(5) of the Charter or as a general principle of EU law.117 By leaving
these matters undecided, the Court basically ignored the in-depth analysis of
Advocate General Trstenjak in her Opinion concerning the legal status and the
nature of the right to paid annual leave.118 The Advocate General considered that
Article 31(2) constituted a ‘social fundamental right’. She explicitly ruled out that
Article 31(2) is a principle ‘which do[es] not create any direct subjective rights’.
Trstenjak primarily relied on the ﬁrst criterion for making a distinction between
rights and principles, as discussed above. She thereby based her reading on the
wording of Article 31(2), which explicitly refers to a ‘right’ for every worker and
hence includes, in her view, a ‘guarantee’ and ‘an individual requirement’. She also
noted a difference between Article 31(2) and other provisions in Chapter IV,
which are worded like ‘a guarantee of objective law in that the rights granted there
are ‘recognised’ or ‘respected’’.119 In this regard she noted that ‘these differences in
wording are evidence of a graduated intensity of protection according to the legal
right concerned’.120 Finally, she based her determination on a ‘systematic
interpretation’ of the structure of the Charter by relying on the ‘proximity […]
substantive connection and structural similarities’ of Article 31 to Articles 28
and 29, which are rights.121
In a subsequent case on paid annual leave,Heimann, the Court reﬂected on the
nature of Article 31(2) of the Charter in a rather similar manner as in its previous
judgment in Dominguez. The Court again held that Article 31(2) as a ‘particularly
important principle of European Union social law […] may not be interpreted
restrictively’.122 Just as in Dominguez, the Court used the terminology of
rights, principles of social law and entitlement interchangeably. In particular, it
held in a rather mystifying way that ‘the right to paid annual leave is, as a principle
117According to Peers and Prechal, the ECJ wanted to emphasise the fundamental character of
entitlement with its reference to ‘a particularly important principle’. They understood this as an
implicit reference to the general principles of EU law; Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.165.
De Mol, however, noted that the ECJ did not determine that the right is a general principle of EU
law; M. De Mol, ‘Dominguez: A deafening silence’, 8 EuConst (2012) p. 280 at p. 282.
118A.G. Trstenjak held that ‘the Court is being invited to state how entitlement to paid annual
leave should be categorised within the hierarchy of norms’ in the EU legal system; Trstenjak, supra
n. 77, para 3. See also L. Pech, ‘Between judicial minimalism and avoidance: the Court of Justice’s
sidestepping of fundamental constitutional issues in Römer and Dominguez’, 49 CML Rev. (2012)
p. 1841 at p. 1852-1853.
119 It is interesting that Trstenjak used the term ‘respect’ for principles, whereas Article 51(1) links
‘respect’ to rights’. Ibid., para 76.
120 Idem.
121 Ibid., para 79.
122ECJ 8 November 2012, Joined Cases C-229/11 and C-230/11, Heimann, para 22 and 23. See
also, among many other judgments, ECJ 19 September 2013, Case C-579/12 RX-II, European
Commission v Strack, para 26.
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of European Union social law, expressly laid down in Article 31(2) of the
Charter’.123 The silence of the Court on the nature of Article 31(2)
notwithstanding, the Heimann case illustrates that the Article can be used as a
standard of legality against which national legislation or practices can be reviewed.
The Court examined the preliminary reference from a German court as to whether
Article 31(2) of the Charter or Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 must be
interpreted as precluding national legislation or practice, in this case a social plan
agreed between an undertaking and its works council, under which the paid
annual leave of a worker on short-time working is calculated according to the rule
of pro rata temporis. The Court eventually answered the question in the negative.
As said, it is still unclear whether Article 31(2) is an individual right which can
be directly invoked before courts.124 The Court of Justice has not expressed itself
on this matter (yet). Nonetheless, it seems to follow from Dominguez andHeiman
that it accepts that this ‘principle of EU social law’ can be classiﬁed as a right in the
sense of Article 52(5) of the Charter. After all, in these cases the Court referred to
the ‘right’ to paid annual leave ﬁve and nine times respectively and it also referred
to a notion of ‘entitlement’, while both terms are commonly used to denote
individual rights.125 Secondly, the Court highlighted the unconditional character
of the ‘right’ and noted that this ‘right’ should not be interpreted restrictively.126
Article 34(3): Kamberaj
A second opportunity for the Court to rule on the distinction presented itself with
the Kamberaj case, which concerned Article 34(3) of the EU Charter on the right
to housing assistance.127 This article is seen by most commentators as a principle
in the sense of Article 52(5).128 Contrary to Dominguez, this case did not
123Dominguez, supra n. 3, para 22. The ECJ used this phrase for the ﬁrst time in Neidel. ECJ
3 May 2012, Case C-337/10, Neidel, para 40.
124The fact that the ECJ did use Art. 31(2) as a standard of legality does not tell us anything about
the nature of Art. 31(2). This is because, at least in a wide reading of the competence of the Court
under the Charter, both rights and principles can be used as standards of review, as shown above.
Nonetheless, the ECJ did not examine whether Directive 2003/88/EC actually implements
Art. 31(2). This would be relevant if the ECJ is of the view that Art. 31(2) is a principle in the sense of
Art. 52(5) and when it favours a restrictive interpretation of Art. 52(5), limiting review to measures
implementing principles.
125See text to n. 70-71 supra.
126See text to n. 48 supra. Dominguez, supra n. 3, para 18-20. Heimann, supra n. 122, para 23.
127Art. 34(3) provides: ‘In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and
respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who
lack sufﬁcient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and national
laws and practices.’
128Kenner, supra n. 9, p. 23. De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 233. Gijzen, supra n. 52, p. 40. Tooze,
supra n. 83, p. 163.
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concentrate on ‘employment related social policy’, but it dealt with a social issue,
i.e. housing and related beneﬁts.129 Mr Kamberaj, an Albanian national who had
resided and been employed in the Italian region of Bolzano since 1994, had
claimed housing beneﬁts for the year 2009, but these had been rejected on the
ground that the budget for the grant of that beneﬁt to third-country nationals had
been exhausted.
Neither Advocate General Bot nor the Court used this opportunity to clarify
the distinction and the legal character of Article 34 of the Charter. This, however,
did not prevent the Court from relying on Article 34(3) as a standard of
interpretation of Article 11(1)(d) of Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status
of third-country nationals who are long-term residents.130 This Article makes it
possible to limit social assistance beneﬁts for long-term residents to core beneﬁts.
Recital 13 to this Directive clariﬁes that core beneﬁts include at least minimum
income support as well as assistance in case of illness, pregnancy, parental
assistance and long-term care. Taking Article 34 into account, the Court basically
concluded that housing beneﬁts also have to be regarded as such core beneﬁts that
cannot be limited. More speciﬁcally, reading Article 11(1)(d) in conjunction with
Article 34 of the Charter, the Court ruled that Article 11(1)(d) can preclude a
national or regional law which treats third-country nationals enjoying the status of
long-term residents differently from nationals when it comes to housing beneﬁts.
Thus, the Court did not interpret the rather conditional language of Article 34 as
excluding judicial review altogether, nor – as Goldsmith has argued – did it read
the Article as meaning that the Charter should not interfere with national
legislation in the ﬁeld of social rights and principles.131 While the Court did not
use Article 34(3) as the standard of review, but based its ﬁndings on the provision
in the Directive instead, it did use the Article to interpret the relevant provision of
the Directive in a Charter-friendly way.132 In doing so, the Court basically applied
the second broader interpretation of Article 52(5), as discussed above, by using
Article 34 to interpret a Directive that was not intended to implement Article 34.
A disappointing aspect of the judgment is the way in which the Court of Justice
used Article 34(3). There is a signiﬁcant lack of detail in the ‘test’ the Court
performed. The Court referred to Article 34 of the Charter in a general way and
failed to specify which of the different paragraphs of this Article it had in mind.
This is noteworthy because there is a difference between the three paragraphs in
129For this distinction, see Barnard, supra n. 40, p. 660.
130 J. Morijn, European Human Rights Cases 2012/162, para 10.
131Kamberaj, supra n. 4, para 81 and 92. Goldsmith, supra n. 17, p. 1213.
132This is what Robin-Olivier referred to as ‘combined effects’ of norms as a result of their
association (‘normative combination’) with other EU law provisions irrespective of whether norms
are capable of having direct effect; S. Robin-Olivier, ‘The evolution of direct effect in the EU:
stocktaking, problems, projections’, 12 ICON (2014) p. 165 at p. 171-175.
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terms of content, speciﬁcity and level of protection.133 In addition, the Court did
not refer to the Explanations to Article 34.134 This lack of precision runs counter
to the ambitious expectations expressed by Advocate General Bot, who had argued
that ‘the present case offers the Court the opportunity to determine the scope of
some of the conditions and restrictions and the way in which to reconcile them
with the objectives referred to in Directive 2003/109 and with fundamental rights
as guaranteed inter alia by Article 34 of the Charter’.135
To sum up, in Kamberaj the Court did not rule on the nature of Article 34(3) as
either a right or a principle. The Kamberaj case illustrates that – as is most likely – a
principle can indeed have an interpretive function, even in relation to acts that do
not explicitly implement that principle. Such an interpretation in conformity with
Article 34 was also proposed by Advocate General Cruz Villalón in the subsequent
case of Časta.136
Article 27: AMS
The third occasion during which the Court could have provided more certainty
arose with the AMS case, which concerned Article 27 of the Charter on workers’
rights to information and consultation within the undertaking.137 AMS, an
association for the reintegration of unemployed persons, challenged and
consequently suspended the appointment of Mr Laboubi as a trade union
representative. AMS was of the opinion that this appointment was not required
since it only employed 11 staff members, while the Directive 2002/14 and the
French Labour Code only made the appointment of a representative obligatory for
workplaces with more than 50 employees. In line with the French Labour Code,
but contrary to the Directive, AMS excluded from its calculation the between 120
and 170 employees it had with a speciﬁc type of contracts (‘accompanied-
employment’). The Grand Chamber of the Court concluded that the French
provision in the Labour Code was incompatible with Article 3(1) of Directive
2002/14. The Court did not make a pronouncement on the conformity of the
Code with Article 27 of the Charter. Instead, it repeated its settled case-law as to
the prohibition of horizontal direct effect of directives, even when they are
133Morijn, supra n. 130, para 12.
134 Ibid., para 11.
135A.G. Bot, Opinion 13 December 2011 in Kamberaj, supra n. 4, para 54.
136A.G. Cruz Villalón held that Art. 34(1) ‘cannot be overlooked in interpreting the provision at
issue’, Art. 11(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations of Ofﬁcials of the EU; A.G. Cruz Villalón,
Opinion 27 June 2013, Case C-166/12, Radek Časta v Česká správa sociálního zabezpečení, para 63.
The ECJ paid no attention to the Charter in its judgment.
137Art. 27 stipulates: ‘Workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be
guaranteed information and consultation in good time in the cases and under the conditions
provided for by Union law and national laws and practices.’
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clear, sufﬁciently precise and unconditional.138 It also observed that an
EU-conform interpretation of the French provision was impossible since this
would result in a contra legem interpretation.139 In this light, it was left with
answering the question as to ‘whether the situation in the case in the main
proceedings is similar to that in the case which gave rise to Kücükdeveci […], so
that Article 27 of the Charter, in and of itself or in conjunction with the provisions
of Directive 2002/14, can be invoked in a dispute between individuals in order to
preclude, as the case may be, the application of the national provision which is not
in conformity with that directive.’140
The Court did not pay attention to the question of whether Article 27 is a
principle or a right. The Court thus did not fulﬁl the ‘task’ it had in the view of
Advocate General Cruz-Villalón, who had reasoned that the case offered the
possibility ‘to ascertain the possible status as a ‘principle’ of Article 27 of the
Charter’.141 The Court rather chose to frame the issue in terms of (horizontal)
direct effect of a Charter provision. But even in relation to this question, the Court
spent only few words on exactly how it can be determined whether a provision is
sufﬁciently clear as to confer an individual right onto individuals.142 The ECJ ﬁrst
considered that the case was different from Kücükdeveci, in which it had
considered that the general principle of non-discrimination on the ground of age
was sufﬁciently clear for individuals to rely on it and thus to have horizontal direct
effect.143 It then referred to the wording of Article 27 and Article 21(1) of the
Charter (the ﬁrst criterion discussed above) to explain the difference between the
two provisions. It considered that Article 27 of the Charter is not ‘a directly
applicable rule of law’, since it is generally formulated and not sufﬁcient in itself to
confer a right on individuals which they can invoke before a national court.144 In
addition, the Court implicitly relied on the second yardstick discussed above by
considering that ‘for this Article [i.e. Article 27] to be fully effective, it must be
given more speciﬁc expression in European Union or national law’.145 This
‘concretisation argument’ is remarkable in the light of the case law of the Court
138AMS, supra n. 5, para 36.
139 Ibid., para 39-40.
140 Ibid., para 41.
141Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 29, para 42. For a critical analysis, see E. Frantziou, ‘Case C-176/12
Association de Médiation Sociale: Some reﬂection on the horizontal effect of the Charter and the
reach of fundamental employment right in the European Union’, 10 EuConst (2014), p. 332.
142According to Frantziou, the ECJ added a new hierarchy of rights-conferring and non-rights-
conferring Charter provisions in addition to the rights-principle distinction. Frantziou, supra n. 141,
p. 344-346.
143The ECJ recognised that this principle is laid down in Art. 21(2) of the Charter as well;
Kücükdeveci, supra n. 45, para 22.
144AMS, supra n. 5, para 46-47.
145 Ibid., para 45.
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discussed earlier, such as Baumbast, in which the Court considered that certain
provisions of the Charter can have direct effect even though they refer to
limitations and conditions.146 Be that as it may, the Court eventually concluded
that Article 27 cannot be invoked in a (horizontal) dispute ‘such as that in the
main proceedings’.147
Although the ECJ did not use the language of rights and principles, the
argument could be made that the Court’s reasoning in AMS basically implies that
Article 27 constitutes a principle, while Article 21(1) can be regarded as a right.148
Such a conclusion would correspond well with the conclusion of Advocate
General Cruz Villalón, who went to great lengths to answer the question as to
whether Article 27 of the Charter is a principle or right. In fact, almost half of the
Advocate General’s Opinion was devoted to the issue of the distinction between
rights and principles and the consequence of such categorisation.149 Given the
objectives of this article, it is interesting to take a closer look at the Opinion and
the criteria used.
Firstly, Advocate General Cruz Villalón based his conclusion that Article 27 of
the Charter constitutes a principle on the provision’s ‘substantive content’.150 He
held that ‘social rights’ are social rights by virtue of their subject matter or content,
i.e. because they deal with social policy, and ‘principles’ by virtue of their
operation, i.e. because they cannot give rise to legally enforceable individual
claims.151 Cruz Villalón also used a ‘systemic argument’ based on its inclusion in
title IV on solidarity.152 He noted that there is ‘a strong presumption’ that the
provisions in this chapter entail principles.153 This is, however, a rather
one-dimensional – and also factually incorrect – depiction of several of the
provisions in Chapter IV, as was already discussed above.154 Most of the Articles
146See text to n. 80-81 supra.
147AMS, supra n. 5, para 48. It is still uncertain whether Art. 27 can never meet the criteria for
direct effect. It cannot be ruled out that the ECJ would arrive at a different conclusion when the facts
of the case are different. M. DeMol, European Human Rights Cases 2014/70, para 6. Frantziou, supra
n. 141, p. 339-340.
148Alternatively, Art. 27 might also be a ‘right’ which does not fulﬁll the conditions for direct
effect. Lazzerini, supra n. 46, p. 932.
149Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 29, para 43-80.
150 Ibid., para 53.
151 Ibid., para 45.
152 Ibid., para 53 and 55. The ECJ had earlier referred to the different character of the provisions in
Title IV when it noted that Article 16 Charter ‘differs from the wording of other fundamental
freedoms laid down in Title II thereof, yet is similar to that of certain provisions of Title IV of the
Charter’. The ECJ furthermore noted the ‘broad range of interventions’ which may limit Art. 16;
ECJ 22 January 2013, C-283/11, Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk, para 46.
153Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 29, para 55.
154See text to n. 49-51 supra.
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in this chapter (broadly speaking; Articles 28-33) are – contrary to what the
Advocate General seems to imply – formulated fairly concretely. Articles 28-33
seem to be capable of conferring a right on individuals even when one adopts a
purely textual interpretation. Article 29, for example, stipulates that ‘everyone has
the right to…’, while Articles 30 and 31 (1) and (2) determine that ‘every worker
has the right to…’.155 In arguing that Chapter IV on solidarity predominantly
includes principles, Cruz Villalón implicitly reinforces the existing dichotomy
between enforceable and justiciable civil and political rights, on the one hand, and
so-called economic, social and cultural rights, on the other.156 It is questionable if
this view can be reconciled with the aims of the drafters of the Charter, since they
actually aimed to overcome this dichotomy by including both these rights in the
same document.157
Secondly, Advocate General Cruz Villalón noted that the scope of Article 27 is
‘extremely weak’ and its content ‘indeterminate’ because it includes a reference to
‘in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices’.158 In doing so, the
Advocate General basically combined the ﬁrst criterion with respect to the
wording, as well as the third criterion dealing with the margin of discretion for
duty bearers (see above). This reading of Article 27 can be criticised, however,
because the wording of Article 27 is actually not so weak as it stipulates that
something ‘must be […] guaranteed’.159 As was mentioned before, the fact that a
provision refers to ‘limitations and conditions’ has not precluded judicial
review.160
The Advocate General. also dealt with the question of the justiciability of
principles in the sense of Article 52(5) and the question of which acts can be
reviewed in the light of principles, a matter which was discussed above. He argued
that if ‘such acts’ would only refer to implementing legislative acts, there would be
a ‘vicious circle’. This is because implementing acts could then only be reviewed in
the light of a principle of which the substance is at the same time determined by
the same act which implements and gives speciﬁc substantive and direct expression
to the content of the principle.161 In line with most commentators, Advocate
General Cruz Villalón thus favoured the broader second interpretation as
155See also Trstenjak, supra n. 77.
156Fredman warned that Art. 52(5) ‘threatens to resuscitate the well-worn division between civil
and political rights and socio-economic rights’. Fredman, supra n. 50, p. 43.
157See text to n. 12 supra.
158Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 29, para 54.
159Kenner held that Art. 27 entails a ‘qualiﬁed guarantee’ and hence ‘blur[s] the rights/ principles
distinction’; Kenner, supra n. 9, p. 19-20. Ladenburger also mentioned Art. 27 as one of the ‘hardest
cases of doubt’; Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 32.
160See text to n. 80-91 and 146 supra.
161Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 29, para 69.
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identiﬁed in Section 5 which enables the review of the legality of other acts going
beyond the implementing act.162
In conclusion, it is clear that in AMS, the Court did not provide any clarity as to
the status of Article 27 as a principle or a right in the sense of Article 52(5) of the
Charter. Rather, it framed the question in terms of (horizontal) direct effect
of a Charter provision and concluded for these purposes that Article 27 did not
have direct effect, given the Article’s wording and the necessity of further
concretisation.
Article 38: Pohotovost and Kušionová
In another case, which was decided shortly after AMS, the Court again remained
silent on the nature of a Charter provision, in this case Article 38 which provides
that EU policies ‘shall ensure a high level of consumer protection’.163 In this case,
the Court was confronted with the request for a preliminary ruling as to whether a
consumer protection association can intervene in support of a consumer in
proceedings for enforcement of a ﬁnal arbitration award against that consumer.
The Court did not make a pronouncement on the nature of Article 38, even
though Advocate General Wahl had explicitly determined that this provision is ‘a
principle and not a right’.164 The Advocate General exclusively referred to the ﬁrst
criterion for the distinction as discussed above and noted that this article ‘has
nothing to say about a directly deﬁned individual legal position’.165 Interestingly,
he did not mention that the Explanations to the speciﬁc article did refer to
‘principles set out in this article’ and only noted that the Explanations did not
mention Article 38 as one of the three examples of a Article 52(5) principle.166
In terms of possibilities for judicial review, the Court of Justice explicitly
accepted that the ‘requirement’ of Article 38 ‘applies to the implementation’ of
Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.167 The Court accepted
that Article 38 can be used as a tool to interpret the Directive.168 Interpreting the
162See text between n. 96 and 110 supra.
163 ‘Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection’.
164A.G. Wahl referred to Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón in AMS with respect to the distinction
and the conditions under which principles can be invoked; A.G. Wahl, Opinion 12 December 2013
in Pohotovost, supra n. 6, para 66.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid. O.J. 2007, C 303/02, p. 12 and 19.
167Pohotovost, supra n. 6, para 52.
168The ECJ did not explicitly state that Directive 93/13 implements Art. 38 Charter within the
meaning of Art. 52(5) Charter. Note that Directive 93/13 only refers to Art. 100 EEC (now 115
TFEU) and not Art. 129a(1) EC (now 169 TFEU). The latter is the only Treaty provision
mentioned in the Explanations to Art. 38 Charter. Interestingly, the A.G. seemed to adopt a
restrictive interpretation of Art. 52(5) Charter, because he only mentioned the possibility of
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Directive in the light of Article 38 was, however, in this case not possible according to
the both the Advocate General and the Court, because this would result in a contra
legem interpretation, considering that the Directive does not expressly provide for a
right for consumer protection associations to intervene. The Court held that Article
38 ‘cannot, by itself, impose an interpretation of that directive which would express
such a right’.169 It is unclear whether the Court would have reached a different
conclusion, had Article 38 been formulated in amore speciﬁc way andmore as a right
in the sense of Article 52(5) Charter.170 In a subsequent case,Kušionová, the Court of
Justice even seemed to imply that Article 38 Charter, which was referred to as a
‘mandatory requirement’ applicable to the implementation of Directive 93/13, can
preclude national legislation. That is to say, the Court did not immediately dismiss
the possibility of legality review when requested by a Slovak court, but only
undertook the review without further reference to Article 38.171
Article 26: Glatzel
It was in Glatzel that the Court of Justice expressed itself for the ﬁrst time on
Article 51(1) and Article 52(5) of the Charter. In this case, the Fifth Chamber of
the Court issued a preliminary ruling on the request of a German court about the
compatibility with the Charter of Annex III to Directive 2006/126/EC (amended
by Directive 2009/113/EC) laying down minimum standards relating to the
physical ﬁtness to drive a motor vehicle as regards visual acuity. The German court
asked the European Court of Justice whether those physical conditions for drivers
constitute discrimination on the grounds of disability and, hence, violate the
principle of equal treatment (Article 20 of the Charter), more speciﬁcally, the
principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of disability (Article 21(1)) as well
as the principle of integrating persons with disabilities (Article 26).172 The Court
interpreting and legality review of ‘Union acts’ and omitted any reference to ‘acts of Member States
when they are implementing Union law’; A.G. Wahl, supra n. 164, para 66. M. De Mol, De directe
werking van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie [The direct effect of the fundamental rights of the
European Union] (Wolf 2014) p. 51.
169Pohotovost, supra n. 6, para 52. A.G. Wahl, supra n. 164, para 67.
170What militates against this possibility is that the ECJ came to the same ﬁnding as regards Article
47 Charter, which is formulated as an individual entitlement. Pohotovost, supra n. 6, para 53.
171The ECJ eventually determined that the Directive does not preclude national legislation
allowing the recovery of debts based on potentially unfair contractual terms by the extrajudicial
enforcement of a charge on immovable property. Note that it is difﬁcult to construe this Slovak law
as an act implementing a principle (Art. 38 Charter) within the meaning of Art. 52(5) Charter. ECJ
10 September 2014, Case C-34/13, Monika Kušionová v SMART capital a.s., para 45-47.
172Art. 26 stipulates: ‘The Union recognises and respects the right of persons with disabilities to
beneﬁt from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration
and participation in the life of the community.’
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of Justice eventually concluded that it did not have sufﬁcient information to
conclude that the Annex is invalid, yet it did offer some considerations as regards
the character of these provisions that are of relevance for the purposes of the
present article.
The Court of Justice ﬁrst thoroughly examined the compatibility of Annex III
with Article 21(1) of the Charter. After this quite extensive review, the Court
performed another test of the compatibility of the Annex with Article 26. The
Court thereby labeled Article 26 of the Charter as a principle. It primarily did so
on the basis of the Explanations to the Charter, to which it made a passing
reference.173 The Court also looked at the wording of the provision and it
mentioned that Article 26 ‘does not require the EU legislature to adopt any
speciﬁc measure’ and that ‘in order for that article to be fully effective, it must be
given more speciﬁc expression in EU law or national law’.174 As in AMS, the
Court thereby used the ‘concretisation argument’ as a decisive criterion.
Apparently, the Court found it necessary to emphasise the difference in nature
of Articles 26 and Article 21(1), the ﬁrst, other than the second, not being a ‘right’,
but a principle. This is remarkable, because in the earlier cases of Dominguez and
AMS it chose to avoid this matter and Advocate General Bot did not at all reﬂect
on the (principled) nature of Article 26. Moreover, the Court could easily have
avoided pronouncing itself on the nature of Article 26 by examining the validity of
Annex III with Articles 21(1) and 26 in an integrated way, as Advocate General
Bot had done in his Opinion.175 Alternatively, the Court could have tested the
validity against Article 21(1) and could have applied the same reasoning mutatis
mutandis to its review of Article 26. Such possibilities of avoidance
notwithstanding, now that the Court had decided to confront the question of
applicability of Article 26 head-on, it could hardly have come to a different
conclusion as to the nature of this provision than that which it eventually reached,
since the text of the Explanations explicitly mention Article 26 as an example of a
principle.176
It is also interesting to examine what implications the Court drew from its
determination that Article 26 is a principle. Firstly, the Court adopted a narrow
and literal reading of Article 52(5) which limits judicial review to measures
implementing a principle, as discussed above. The Court held that ‘reliance on
Article 26 […] before the court is allowed for the interpretation and review of
the legality of legislative acts of the European Union which implement the
principle laid down in that article, namely the integration of persons with disabilities’
173Glatzel, supra n. 7, para 74.
174 Ibid., para 78.
175 Ibid., para 41-58.
176O.J. 2007, C 303/32, p. 19.
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(emphasis added).177 Note that this interpretation is more restrictive than the
Court’s earlier approach in Kamberaj and Kušionová where judicial review was not
limited to legislative acts ‘implementing’ a Charter principle.178 The Court
subsequently went on to consider whether Directive 2006/126 is a legislative act
that implements the principle of Article 26. It held that ‘in so far as Directive
2006/126 is a legislative act of the European Union implementing the principle
contained in Article 26 of the Charter, the latter provision is intended to be
applied to the case in the main proceedings’.179 Interestingly, the Dutch- and
German-language versions of the judgment are formulated in more unconditional
terms. Instead of using the more tentative ‘in so far’ they start with ‘since’ and thus
imply that the Court of Justice is of the opinion that the Directive is an act
implementing the principle in Article 26.180 This, however, suggests a wide notion
of implementation, because it is difﬁcult to see how Directive 2006/126 on
driving licenses can be really seen as implementing the principle of Article 26.181
Thus, on the one hand, the Court of Justice can be criticised for adopting a
restrictive reading by limited review to acts implementing a Charter principle. On
the other hand, the Court can be reprehended for casting the net too wide as to
what constitutes an implementing act.
Secondly, the Court conﬁrmed that Article 26 ‘cannot itself confer on
individuals a subjective right which they may invoke as such’.182 The Court was,
however, silent on the broader role of principles as standard for legal review or
tools of interpretation. Although it paraphrased Article 52(5), which stipulates
that principles can be used as an interpretational tool or legality review, the Court
did not acknowledge that principles can have a judicial function beyond this
traditional narrow understanding of direct effect on the basis of Article 52(5).
It has been shown above that while principles indeed cannot act as a ‘sword’, they
can certainly act as a shield and offer protection against conﬂicting EU or national
norms. This means that when a litigant has standing on the basis of another
ground than the principle, a judge can strike down a legislative or executive act on
the basis of a principle in the Charter. The Court unfortunately did not reﬂect on
this possibility. By only conducting a review of the validity of Annex III with
Article 21(1) and not Article 26, the Court seems to emphasise that principles
cannot be used in judicial review at all.
177Glatzel, supra n. 7, para 74.
178Text to n. 132 and 171 supra. See alsoCruz-Villalón, supra n. 161-162 and the text to n. 96-110
supra.
179 Ibid., para 76.
180Respectively ‘aangezien’ and ‘da’.
181Directive 2006/126 does, however, refer to disabled persons in recital 14, Art. 4(5), 5(2), 6(4)
(a) and Annex III.
182Glatzel, supra n. 7, para 78.
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Hence, in Glatzel the Court of Justice for the ﬁrst time paid close attention to
the distinction between rights and principles and the nature of Article 26 as
containing a principle. The Court should be applauded for being explicit about
this, although unfortunately it did not provide much guidance on the exact role of
principles in judicial review and adopted a restrictive interpretation of the
measures which can be reviewed.
Conclusion
This article examined the role of principles in the case law of the European Court
of Justice, focusing on two speciﬁc issues: ﬁrstly, the extent to which a distinction
is made between rights and principles and the criteria used to make such a
distinction, and, secondly, the implications of this (lack of) distinction for judicial
review.
Because the drafters of the Charter could not achieve consensus on the
nature of each provision of the Charter, they decided to leave this matter for the
Court to decide upon. The cases discussed above show that the Court of Justice has
so far not taken on this task with much enthusiasm, nor with a very consistent
approach. The Court only very recently, in Glatzel, referred to Articles 51(1)
and 52(5) and a Charter provision as containing a principle. Before that, the
Court remained silent on the distinction between rights and principles.
Its judgment in Glatzel – and indirectly also AMS, where the Court framed the
matter in terms of (horizontal) direct effect183 – as well as the Opinions of the
Advocate General in Dominguez, AMS and Pohotovost provide some clarity as to
the criteria (which could be) used to make such a distinction. Table 1 summarises
the main ﬁndings and shows that the ﬁrst and second criteria discussed
above, dealing respectively with the wording and necessity of concretisation,
have been used most frequently. InGlatzel and AMS the Court of Justice primarily
looked at the degree of concretisation required by a Charter provision, whereby
the wording of the provision was used as the starting point. Its conclusions in
Glatzel that Article 26 contains a principle and in AMS that Article 27 does
not have direct effect, were based on the argument that for these article
‘to be fully effective, [they] must be given more speciﬁc expression in EU law or
national law’.
The Court of Justice has paid even less attention to the second question, of
what role Charter principles can have in judicial review and how they can
be ‘judicially cognisable’ in the sense of the ﬁnal sentence of Article 52(5).
183This, and the fact that the criteria used to make a distinction between Charter rights and
principles closely resemble the conditions for direct effect, implies that this distinction is largely a
‘modern’ and adapted version of the doctrine of direct effect. Robin-Olivier, supra n 132, p. 169. See
text to n. 67 and 102 supra and n. 188 infra.
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Table 1: Overview of the main ﬁndings on EU Charter principles
Right or principle? Implication for judicial review
- Direct effect/ entitlement (right)
- Standard of legality (rights & principles)
- Tool for interpretation (rights & principles)
ECJ A.G. ECJ A.G.
Dominguez Article 31(2) ‘particularly important principle
of EU social law’ (Charter not
cited)
right [criteria: wording
(individual entitlement) &
systemic argument; proximity
to Articles 28-29]
— Used as standard of legality
Heimann Article 31(2) ‘particularly important principle
of EU social law’
X [no Opinion] Used as standard of legality X [no Opinion]
Kamberaj Article 34(3) — — Used as tool for interpretation Used as tool for interpretation
AMS Article 27 Silent on distinction 52(5).
Excluded direct effect [criteria:
wording & necessity of
concretisation]
Principle [criteria: wording,
margin of discretion & systemic
argument: Chapter IV]
Determined that Art. 27 is no
subjective right
— Determined that Art. 27 can be
standard of legality
— Review not limited to measures
implementing principles
Pohotovost Article 38 — Principle [criteria: wording (no
individual entitlement)]
Used as tool for interpretation Used as tool for interpretation
Glatzel Article 28 Principle [criteria: wording &
necessity of concretisation]
— — Determined that no subjective
right
— Silent on speciﬁcs review; but
stated that review is limited
to measures implementing
principles
Used as standard of legality
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In Glatzel, the Court adopted a restrictive interpretation of Article 52(5) by
limiting judicial review to measures implementing a certain Charter principle.
While the Court held that Article 26 as a principle ‘cannot itself confer on
individuals a subjective right which they may invoke as such’, it did not pay
attention to the role of principles as standard for legal review or tools of
interpretation. However, in other cases the Court was not concerned with the
implications of Article 52(5) and simply applied Charter provisions which are
arguably principles.184 In Heimann, it used a principle of social EU law as a
standard of legality. In Kamberaj and Pohotovost, the Court did apply Article 34(3)
and Article 38 – which are generally seen as principles – as interpretational tools to
arrive at a consistent interpretation. This interpretational function was also
proposed with respect to the seeming principles of Articles 34, 35 and 37 in
subsequent cases by an Adovocate General or the Commission.185
What could explain the Court’s earlier reluctance to make a pronouncement on
the distinction until Glatzel as well as its current reluctance to address the
distinction’s implications for judicial review? One possibility could be that
the Court of Justice is still in the ‘start-up phase’ with respect to the Charter since
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Several scholars noted that in the
ﬁve years since, the Court has not really been consistent in its application of the
Charter.186 Another explanation would be that the silence of the Court of Justice
is a deliberate tactic. As was noted by Pech, the Court’s reluctance ‘may simply
reﬂect the pragmatic wish – albeit one which cannot be confessed – to spare itself
the dreadful task of making sense of the Charter’s general provisions, which aim to
constrain its interpretation and scope of application’.187 Several elements might
184This also reﬂects the broader trend that the ECJ not always examines whether the conditions for
direct effect are fulﬁlled, but just applies an EU provision to the case. Othmar Michaeler, supra
n. 106. De Witte, supra n. 101, p. 332. Robin-Olivier, supra n. 132, p. 174-175.
185A.G. Cruz Villalón,, supra n. 136. In Petru, the Commission (and the applicant) proposed an
interpretation of Art. 22 Regulation 1408/17 in conformity with Art. 35 Charter dealing with health
care; A.G. Cruz Villalón, Opinion 19 June 2014, Case C-268/13, Elena Petru, para 12 and 14. See
also A.G. Bot held that the achievement of a high level of environmental protection, as laid down
in – amongst others – Article 37 Charter, is ‘an imperative requirement’ which enjoys ‘pre-eminence
over other considerations’; A.G. Bot, Opinion 8 May 2013, Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12,
Essent Belgium NV, para 95-96.
186De Búrca, for instance, noted the ECJ’s lack of human rights experience and expertise; G. De
Búrca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the Court of Justice as a human rights
adjudicator?’, 20MJ (2013) p. 168 at p. 170-171. Pech, supra n. 118. S. Iglesias Sánchez, ‘The Court
and the Charter: the impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the ECJ’s approach to
fundamental rights’, 49 CML Rev. (2012) p. 1565 at p. 1568. S. Douglas-Scott, ‘The European
Union and human rights after the Treaty of Lisbon’, 11 HRLR 4 (2011) p. 645 at p. 678-679.
187Pech, supra n. 118, 1861. Iglesias Sánchez, supra n. 186, 1609. Lazzerini referred to the fear to
open the ‘Pandora’s box of the rights-principles distinction’; Lazzerini, supra n. 46, p. 931.
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explain this ‘principled silence’ with respect to Article 52(5) as well, at least in
the judgments before Glatzel. Firstly, it could be that the heated opposition of
several states to justiciable rights, most notably of the UK, contribute to the
Court’s unwillingness to make solid use of Charter principles. It thus seems that
the shadow of Protocol 30 stipulating that ‘nothing in Title IV of the
Charter creates justiciable rights’ weighs on the Court. Secondly, some of the
judges in the Court of Justice might be of the opinion that the distinction
between rights and principles is irrelevant or impracticable. Rather than including
a new terminology and categories in the EU legal order, the Court might prefer to
stick to its earlier approach and case law. This was also suggested by Prechal, a
judge at the Court of Justice, who questioned the distinction between right and
principles and argued that the more relevant question is whether the provision of
the Charter fulﬁls the requirement for direct effect; whether it is sufﬁciently
precise and unconditional. She argued that a separate assessment as to whether an
invoked Charter provision is a right or principle in the sense of Article 52(5)
‘seems redundant’.188 Elsewhere, Prechal, who was one of the judges deciding
AMS, suggested that the AMS judgment should be read in this light.189 This
explanation seems justiﬁed in the light of the similar dynamics, observed above,
that underlie the doctrine of (in)direct effect and the distinction between Charter
rights and principles.190
The Glatzel judgment, however, does not match this explanation, because the
Fifth Chamber of the Court of Justice found it necessary to frame the issue in
terms of rights and principles.191 The Court thus left its ‘principled silence’ behind
in Glatzel and accepted the challenge of clarifying the difference between rights
and principles and the consequences of that difference. Although Glatzel was a
logical ﬁrst step in the sense that it acknowledged that there are differences
between rights and principles in terms of judicial review, it did not fully spell out
all the implications of Article 52(5), thereby still leaving a considerable amount of
uncertainty. It remains to be seen whetherGlatzel will be the exception or whether
it will be a prelude to a new line of cases which explicitly engage with the
distinction. If the Court chooses to continue along the Glatzel path, it is to be
188Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.190.
189She made these statements during a seminar on the EU Charter. ‘Verslag NJCM-Seminar. Het
EU-Handvest. Van toenemende betekenis voor EU-Grondrechtenbescherming?’ [Report of the
NJCM Seminar. The EU Charter. Of increasing signiﬁcance for EU fundamental rights
protection?], 39 NTM/NJCM-Bulletin (2014) p. 121.
190See n. 183 supra.
191One explanation for this difference might be that Prechal was not a judge in Glatzel. Judges in
Glatzel were, amongst others, Von Danwitz and Rosas, who both have written on the difference
between rights and principles in terms of possibilities for judicial review. Von Danwitz, supra n. 68.
A. Rosas and L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law. An introduction (Hart 2012) p. 178-179.
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hoped that it provides more detailed criteria to determine whether a provision is a
right or principle. Further clariﬁcation is also desirable as regards the consequences
of the distinction between rights and principles for the type of judicial review that
is possible. That would prevent the Court from being criticised for an arbitrary or
inconsistent approach.
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